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   This essay concerns the management of human resources in the stylized large Japanese 
firm. The emphasis is on issues of internal incentives, how the Japanese firm provides its 
employees with incentives to behave in harmony with goals of the firm. By drawing freely the 
insights from the growing literature on the economics of organizations (incentive theory), I 
attempt o explain economic rationale of some of the distinct features of Japanese management 
practices concerning pay and promotion systems. 
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1. Iniroduction*
    This essay concerns the management of human resources in the stylized large Japanese 
firm. The emphasis is on issues of internal incentives, how the Japanese firm provides its 
employees with incentives to behave in harmony with goals of the firm.' The paper takes 
an economic approach: By drawing freely the insights from the growing literature on the 
economics of organizations (incentive theory), I attempt o explain economic rationale of 
some of the distinct features of Japanese human resource management practices, particularly 
on pay and promotion systems, as well as discuss possible reasons why they are different from 
the Western management practices. Of course, this does not imply that I intend to refute 
other paradigms such as those by sociologists, anthropologists, or historians: The economic 
approach is but one of many alternative ways to look at the Japanese management practices 
closely. 
   Presenting an exhaustive survey of the economic literature on Japanese firms is not the 
purpose of the paper. There are large bodies of comparative empirical studies that attempt 
to "demystify" Japanese management, identifying what distinguish the Japanese firm from its 
Western counterpart. Today's informed readers probably know that what is unique in Japan 
is a much more subtle question than popular writings have suggested. In Section 2, I briefly 
review some stylized facts about the Japanese human resource management, by referring to 
the recent empirical research. However, my aim throughout the paper is not to contribute to 
 * The author would like to thank Masahiko Aoki
, Banri Asanuma, Osamu Hayashida, Hi-
royuki Itami, John McMillan, Tsuyoshi Namikawa, Masuyuki Nishijima, Isao Ohashi, Toshiaki 
Tachibanaki, and Yuji Yumoto for helpful comments and discussions, and Akiko Yamazaki for 
editorial assistance. Financial support from the Japan Economic Research Foundation is 
gratefully acknowledged.   ' 
For issues on training and human capital, see the paper by Kato in the same volume. 
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our further understanding of what is unique and what is not in Japanese firms. I basically 
take the characteristics summarized there for granted, and focus on their causes and economic 
rationality. 
    In Section 3, I discuss implications from the distinct characteristics of work organization 
structures of the Japanese firm for incentive issues. One of the main messages of the paper is 
that the reward structures of the Japanese firm are designed so as to alleviate various incentive 
problems associated with its work organization structures. Its differences in pay, promotions, 
and employment relations from the Western firm can also be attributed to the differences 
in work organization. I discuss some possible reasons why work organization structures are 
different between Japan and the West, but the discussion is highly incomplete because of the 
very preliminary stage of economic studies of organization structures. 
   The premise of the paper is the following: It is substantial lifetime pay differences stem-
ming from different rates of promotions that motivate employees in the Japanese firm. Un-
fortunately, the empirical research testing this hypothesis is scarce. In Sections 4 to 6, I 
thus focus on its theoretical justification and implications. Section 4 concerns the lack of pay 
for performance. The hypothesis implies that Japanese employees are not rewarded immedi-
ately and transiently after some (objective or subjective) measures ofindividual performance 
become available. Again, no empirical research is available, yet the recent development in 
the principal-agent paradigm provides some illuminating logic leading to such a feature , in 
particular, in the Japanese firm given its organization structures. 
   If pay for performance is absent in the short run, incentives must be provided for employees 
over their career, and to do so, long-term attachment between employers and employees is 
necessary. In Section 5, I discuss the nature of long-term relationships in Japan . My standpoint 
there is that it is structures and practices adopted by the Japanese firm which are responsible 
for the strong degree of employer-employee attachment over long periods . 
    Section 6 then concerns promotion schemes-reward attached to discrete "hierarchical 
ranks." I discuss several economic theories that explain why pay is attached to discrete ranks 
rather than individuals, and their implications for the promotion patterns characterizing the 




   The purpose of this section is to summarize some of the representative features of the 
human resource management practices of the stylized Japanese firm, in a comparative per-
spective to the Western firm. The summary here is brief and not intended to be complete: in 
particular, few supporting data will be shown. Aoki (1988), Hashimoto (1989), Koike (1988), 
and Lincoln and McBride (1987) offer more extensive surveys of the empirical studies, and 
detailed escription and supporting data for the characteristics presented below.2 
   I have chosen to review the following topics: long-term employment relationships; com-
pensation policies; promotion scheme; and work organization. Note that not all of Japanese 
firms or their employees share the features summarized below. My major focus is on regular 
male (both blue-collar and while-collar) workers of large private companies in Japan.3 
FACT 1: Long-term employment relationships are more prevalent in Japan. 
   Long-term employment relationships are common ot only in Japan but also in many 
Western countries. However, careful empirical studies eem to show that this feature is more 
prevalent in Japan: For example, an average worker in Japan stays longer with the same 
employer than an average worker in the U.S. does, and the former does not change jobs as 
often as the latter (Hashimoto and Raisian, 1985). Whittaker (1990)'s comparison between 
Japan and Britain shows that a greater proportion of Japanese workers has "long tenure" than 
British workers. Koike (1988) and OECD Employment Outlook (1984) contain similar esults 
in comparison with other European workers as well. 
   The durable attachment of a worker to an employer occurs when the employer does not 
fire the worker and when the worker does not leave the firm. The first of these two conditions 
is known as "lifetime" employment: Except for extreme situations, the firm does not fire 
workers (until mandatory etirement, ofcourse).' The lifetime mployment thus only binds the 
  2 I have attempted to choose English references whenever available . However, I apologize 
to those readers who do not have Japanese language proficiency for sometimes (inevitably) 
referring to the literature written in Japanese. 
 3 Of course, this does not imply that medium/small firms or temporary/female workers are 
unimportant in the Japanese economy. 
  ' The Japanese firm usually resorts to shorter work hours, work sharing, and transfers, 
prior to firing. 
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employer. Note however that this is not a contractual state: no explicit clause regarding this 
policy is found in the employment contract. In fact, Japanese labor law prohibits the contracts 
covering more than one year, and the usual practice is not to specify the employment period. 
Thus, the enforcement of the no-firing policy in Japan must somehow rely on non-contractual, 
implicit mechanisms such as reputation, which make the policy self-enforcing.' 
    The second condition for long-term employment relations, that Japanese workers do not 
separate from their employers in mid-career as often as workers in Western countries do, 
depends on the competitiveness of the external labor market. It is determined partly by 
exogenous factors and partly by endogenous factors such as structures and practices of firms. 
The discussion in Section 5 emphasizes the latter factors. 
FACT 2: (a) Not only white-collar but also blue-collar workers are paid monthly salary and 
biannual bonuses; (b) Salary rises at regular intervals (usually every one to two years), and 
also at the time of promotion to higher hierarchical "ranks," on the basis of age and tenure 
(and merit assessments, particularly for the latter); (c) Wages are not attached to particular 
jobs, i.e., ranks are only loosely associated with specific job classifications. 
   Word "rank" in Fact 2 is worth clarifying. There are two kinds of discrete hierarchical 
ranks which I call vertical ranks and horizontal ranks.' The former are associated with hi-
erarchical titles (yakushoku) such as section chief, department head, and so on, and hence 
promotion to a higher vertical rank (shoshin) implies changes in authority and/or responsi-
bility. On the other hand, the latter horizontal ranks are artificially created grades (kyli or 
shikaku) which are used for differential treatment ofindividuals in terms of status and/or pay 
only. Promotion to a higher ank in this sense (shokyu or shokaku) implies no essential change 
in authority, responsibility, or jobs performed. These two sorts of ranks are interrelated to 
some degree since a hierarchical job title often has a specific grade as a prerequisite: promotion 
to a higher vertical rank may not be possible before a particular horizontal rank is reached. 
   Figure a illustrates the stylized pay scheme in Japan. A new employee is first assigned to 
  5 Despite this contractual incompleteness
, however, judicial mechanisms sometimes nforce 
the lifetime mployment policy in Japan. The Supreme Court has often ruled against firing 
decisions by firms unless they are sufficiently reasonable (Tsuchida, 1989). 
 ' These roughly correspond to "vertical hierarchies" and "horizontal hierarchies" in Stiglitz 
(1975), respectively. Aoki's (1988) "ranking hierarchy" is more associated with the latter, 
horizontal one. 
4
the lowest rank (Rank 1 in the figure), and is paid his salary which is attached to that rank. 
His salary increases regularly with tenure or age, along the curve. The pay raise also depends 
on merit assessment, and that is why each curve in the figure has some breadth: workers 
with the same tenure and age possibly receive different wages according to their merit ratings. 
The slope of each curve becomes less flat as the worker's age and tenure increase. At some 
point in his career, he is promoted to a higher ank (Rank 2) with the steeper wage-seniority 
curve, based on seniority and merit assessment. After he stays with that rank and receives 
regular pay raise according to the curve, he may be promoted to the next level (Rank 3), 
and this career development continues. Fact 2 is mainly concerning each wage-seniority curve. 
Promotion is the subject of Fact 3 below.
[Insert Figure a about here.]
   Koike (1988) claims that many of the features in Fact 2 are common i  white-collar work-
ers in a number of Western countries, while only in Japan these features extend to production 
workers: the uniqueness of the Japanese firm is in its "white-collarization" of blue-collar work-
ers. Ishida (1990) argues, based mainly on the comparison with British workers, that wages 
contingent on merit ratings are the most distinct characteristics of the pay system for Japanese 
production workers, which contrast with wages attached to jobs for production workers in the 
West. Several systematic empirical studies how that many of these characteristics are more 
prevalent in Japan. Hashimoto and Raisian (1985) find that (i) wages typically rise more 
rapidly with tenure for Japanese workers than for American workers; (ii) firm-specific experi-
ence (tenure) has a greater effect han general experience (total years of work experience) in 
Japan while the pattern is reversed in the United States. Kalleberg and Lincoln (1988) find 
that personal characteristics such as age, tenure, and marital status are important determi-
nants of earnings for Japanese production workers while job characteristics play a greater role 
for American workers. In accordance with this last evidence, Ono (1989) argues that much 
of the positive slope of wage-seniority curves reflects the firm's intention to guarantee living 
expenses of workers. 
   There is no systematic research that attempts to measure the effect of merit assessments 
on salary increases in Japan. However, casual observation seems to indicate that the salary 
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increase upon promotion is much more important than annual regular pay raise. Fujimura 
(1989), although the data are old (1966), reports that for most employees (about 80% for 
firms with more than 5,000 employees, 65% for firms with 1,000 to 4,999 employees) the 
difference between the highest and the lowest regular salary increases i within 5% range. 
Tachibanaki (1987, 1988), using the 1975 survey data on Social Stratification and Mobility 
in Japan, find that the hierarchical (vertical) ranks have the most important influence on 
earnings differentials. 
   Other distinct features of compensation practices in the Japanese firm are biannual 
bonuses and lump-sum payment at the time of separation. What role the bonus system plays 
in Japan is a question that has frequently been discussed and examined by economists: The 
bonus may be a worker's hare of returns to firm-specific human capital (Hashimoto, 1979), 
a sort of profit sharing mechanism stabilizing employment (Freeman and Weitzman, 1987) orr 
providing effort incentives for the worker (Ohashi, 1989; Okuno, 1984). Aoki (1988) alerts us 
by noting that much of the bonus payment depends on merit assessments, more than basic 
salary contractually specified does. Aoki also notes that the separation payment typically rises 
sharply with tenure and depends on the reason of separation (private or company reasons). 
FACT 3: (a) Workers in the Japanese firm tend to experience a wider range of closely related 
jobs than those in the Western firm; (b) The promotion pattern in Japan is a late selection 
approach, that is, the majority are not differentiated from their cohort until 10 to 15 years of 
tenure, and then only a minority is selected to go on to upper management positions.
   Koike (1988) argues that (a) and (b) are two of the features that differentiate he human 
resource management of the Japanese firm from that of its Western counterpart. Unfortu-
nately, there is not much systematic evidence. Koike (1988) offers ome vidence of (a), while 
I know no comparative study of promotion speed. Rosenbaum (1979) observes patterns of 
early selections of "stars" in personnel date of a large firm in the United States. According 
to his data, 2 of 671 newly hired employees in 1962 (0.3%) attained the highest position after 
13 years of tenure. The personnel data of a large oil company in the United States in Forbes 
(1987) show that the ratio is 2% (4 of 180 reached the highest position after 11 years of tenure). 
On the other hand, Hanada (1989) offers career trees of 5 Japanese firms. The ratios of the 
employees in the same cohort who reached the highest rank after 15 years of tenure are 3%, 
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65%, 74%, 81%, and 100%: Except for one firm, property (b) is evident.? For other evidence 
on (b), see Pucik (1985) and papers in Koike (1991).8 
   Although seniority is still an important determinant of promotion decisions, merit ratings 
appear no less important.9 In the long run, substantial pay differences among workers with the 
same experience and education seem to emerge, which mainly originate from different promo-
tion rates. Weiss (1984, 1988) find such a pattern in large Japanese manufacturers and argue 
that its motivational effect is a "reality" of Japanese productivity. One comparative study 
of large earnings data in Japan and the United States, Kalleberg and Lincoln (1988), finds 
that promotion expectations of workers are positively and strongly related to their earnings 
in Japan, though no such relation is found in American data. 
FACT 4: (a) Job demarcation i  work organization f the Japanese firm is more ambiguous 
and fluid; (b) More de facto responsibility is delegated tolower tiers of hierarchy in Japan. 
   The first feature is somehow summarized asfollows. The Japanese firm tends not to use 
detailed job classifications or to offer clear job description toeach individual worker. Jobs are 
assigned to a group of workers who closely collaborate operform them, via mutual help and 
information sharing. A group leader often has to some degree discretion over job assignment 
within the group. Workers perform multiple tasks via intragroup job rotation. Concerning 
the second feature, what is delegated may be a task to cope with emergency (Koike, 1988), 
coordination among workshops (Aoki, 1988), or production decisions such as scheduling and 
quality control (Cole, 1989; Monden, 1983). 
   There is ample anecdotal, case study evidence on these features, and even quantitative 
evidence based on systematic data exists, which mostly accord with the description given 
  7 However, his data also show that even though many individuals reach the highest position 
among them after 15 years, there is nonnegligible diversity (a few years) in their speed. In 
addition, Both Rosenbaum and Hanada find that employees promoted in the earliest period 
have much better chance of being further promoted than those not promoted in the earliest 
period.  8 
Note that because of the nature of personnel data, most of the empirical literature men-
tioned here looks at career development during the high growth period in Japan, through 
1960s to 1970s. It is often said that Japanese labor practices are now changing, toward faster 
promotion, less dependence on seniority, and so on. I do not discuss this issue in the paper 
because of the lack of enough systematic, quantitative evidence at this time. 
 9 For example, the empirical study by Tachibanaki (1988) finds that seniority is important, 
but not a necessary condition, for promotion. 
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above (Lincoln, et al., 1986; for other quantitative studies, see the survey by Lincoln 
McBride).
and
3. Work Organization Structures
    Because the focus of the paper is on internal incentives, I mostly take the characteristics 
of organization structures as given in my argument. Theoretical comparative analyses of dif-
ferent organization and information structures, with reference toJapanese work organization, 
are found in Aoki (1986, 1988, 1990) and Itoh (1987, 1988). These papers take the team theo-
retic approach, assuming away incentive problems, and identify several environmental factors 
that affect the choice of organization structures: The Japanese type work organization with 
the properties mentioned in the previous section (Fact 4) is more effective as scale conomies 
are less important, environmental changes are continual but not too drastic, or workers have 
sufficiently high learning capabilities. The results suggest possible explanations of the differ-
ences in work organization between Japan and the West. For example, there may be reasons 
in Japan that discount the importance of scale economies, such as the smaller domestic mar-
kets than those in the West and high land prices and the scarcity of land supply which raise 
inventory costs more in Japan and hence discourage high buffer inventories. 
   There is some preliminary theoretical research on organization structures from incentive 
viewpoints as well. Prendergast (1990b) studies delegation ofresponsibilities: He shows that 
managers may have an incentive to exert oo much authority over their subordinates to improve 
own career prospects. He then shows that the problem is mitigated when the labor market 
is non-competitive, e.g., because firms collude in hiring. Itoh (1991a, b) show that work 
organization with ambiguous job demarcation may be preferred by the employer f om a purely 
incentive r ason: having workers engage inseveral ctivities make worker motivation keep high 
even though each task is monotonous and boring and hence they may free ride on others' help.1° 
This result depends on costs of workers' doing multiple tasks. Sometimes it is too costly to 
force workers to exert effort o an additional task quite different from his other tasks. In fact, 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990b) present the opposite case in which it is always optimal for 
 10 Monden (1983) regards this effect as one of the advantages of regular job rotation in the 
Toyota production system. 
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the firm to make a worker specialize in a set of similar activities in terms of the measurability 
of performance, because such a job design reduces the distortion in how the worker allocates 
his attention among activities. Tirole (1986) argues that job rotation across work groups 
can discourage coalitional behavior detrimental to the organization, such as manipulation of 
information by supervisors while Itoh (1990, 1991b) argue that job rotation within work teams 
facilitates mutual monitoring and sanctioning among members, and the resulting cooperation 
among workers benefits the employer by reducing incentive costs. 
   Although these studies uggest that the optimal organization structures be determined 
partly by incentive considerations, they are still preliminary, and hence in this paper I mostly 
consider one direction, from structures to incentives. 
   The differences in work organization structures provide the following implications on 
incentive issues: 
 1. The Japanese firm suffers from the lack of objective individual performance measures of
   production workers, and thus relies on subjective performance measures more than the 
   Western firm. 
 2. Cooperation among workers in performing tasks is more important in the Japanese firm 
   because its structure ishighly dependent on their lateral interactions. 
 3. The Japanese firm counts more on effort and capability at lower levels in hierarchy (via 
   more extensive delegation) than the Western firm. 
   These claims being given, I analyze the reward system (compensation a d promotion) in 
the Japanese firm in the subsequent sections.
4. Weak Link between Pay and Performance in the Short Run
    The summary in Section 2indicates that compensation foran employee in the Japanese 
firm is, in the short run, not sensitive to any of his performance measures, whatever available 
there are. By the short run I mean such a short period that no selection decision for promotion 
is made. Then each employee is paid a fixed basic salary associated with his pay rank, with 
biannual bonuses and various allowances. The basic pay in general increases regularly every 
year while the major determinants of the amount of pay raise seem to be personal character-
istics such as age, tenure, marital status, and so on (for quantitative evidence, see Kalleberg 
9
and Lincoln (1988)). Although the bonuses depend on corporate performance, in large firms 
the perceived connection between bonuses and individual performance will be weak since the 
corporate performance measures such as profits are too much aggregated to reflect individual 
effort. Merit assessment is said to be an important determinant ofan employee's earnings, 
while it is more important in promotion decisions, and the incentive ffect of the merit rating 
on bonuses and regular increases in basic wages appears to be limited. 
   The purpose of this section is to offer theoretical justification for this seemingly weak tie 
between pay and performance in the short run. Note that this observation may be valid in 
Western firms as well as in Japanese firms. Baker et al. (1988) point out this anomaly by 
referring to empirical evidence from American data. Because I do not know any comparative 
empirical research on the extent of this feature in various countries, no attempt to explain 
international differences is made here, except for some predictions. 
   I assume that some sources of information about individual performance, either objective 
or subjective measures, are available: If neither of objective measure nor subjective assessment 
is available, the lack of pay for individual performance is obvious.11 I however remind the 
readers that as I have argued in the preceding section, objective measures even for production 
workers are hard to obtain under the Japanese work organization. The main point argued here 
is that given the work organization practices of the Japanese firm, it is often in the interest of 
the firm not to reward workers immediately and transiently after their performance measures 
become available.
4.1. The Tradeoff between Incentives and Risk Sharing 
   The principal-agent paradigm has provided theoretical basis for rewarding individual con-
tributions. The standard moral hazard model illuminates a tradeoff between incentives and 
risk sharing (or fairness, in the sense that one would not like his/her rewards to be affected 
by uncontrollable factors):12 Suppose that an employee is offered a fixed (time-based) salary 
 11 In addition, I implicitly assume that these measures are verifiable in courts, and hence 
employment contracts can be written such that pay is contingent on them. Otherwise, pay 
cannot be contingent on current performance b cause there is a hazard of employers eneging 
the contracts which contain such pay for performance lauses. Note that in such a case pay 
can still be contingent on past performance b cause it can be self-enforceable via reputation 
(see MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) for a formal model), and hence the problems discussed 
here are still valid. 
 12 See Hart and Holmstrom (1987) for a survey. 
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the level of which is competitive and high enough for him to accept i . Such a pay scheme has 
an advantage that the income of the employee is not subject o exogenous ri k, given that he 
is risk averse (or has limited wealth). However, he is going to work in the way he likes best, 
as long as he is not caught by the firm for not behaving appropriately. Implicit here is the 
assumption that there is a conflict in interests between the firm and the employee, stemming 
from costs or distastes to exert effort, incongruity in risk preferences, different information 
concerning tasks, and so on. To induce desirable behavior, the firm must design compensa-
tion sensitive to the employee's actions via use of objective performance measures uch as the 
number of units produced, sales, divisional profits, and so on, and subjective measures uch as 
merit ratings by supervisors. They are however quite noisy measures of the employee's effort 
and hence make his income less predictable, subject o the factors that he cannot control. The 
result is higher average pay, because the firm must compensate for the risk premium so as to 
keep him work for the firm. 
   The argument given above offers one explanation of the lack of performance-based pay: it 
is sometimes too costly in terms of risk sharing to provide incentives through immediate pay for 
performance. Suppose that the firm can force an employee to select at least some minimum 
level of effort. Inducing him to work a little bit harder than that level is not costly if the 
minimum level is modest (e.g., being present at his private office). However, if the minimum 
level is so high (e.g., because he works with others including his boss in a large room) that a 
small increase of effort from the lowest possible level is painful (i.e., his marginal disutility is 
large), there is a fixed cost of providing incentives towork harder due to risk bearing. Thus, if 
the minimum enforceable effort level is already high, the firm may not provide incentives via 
pay for performance, unless a substantially higher level of effort is required. The argument 
depends on the costs of monitoring inputs (effort) and outputs (performance). Since the 
latter costs are higher under the Japanese work practices uch as ambiguous job contents 
and regular job rotation within groups, it is expected that the practice of paying production 
workers contingent on objective measures will be less widespread in Japan.
4.2. Missing Incentives for Multi- Task Workers 
   When a worker is assigned to several different tasks or his single task has several aspects 
that cannot be characterized by a single activity, the incentive problem has a new dimension: 
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allocation of effort o various tasks/activities. A production worker may have to care about 
his production rate, quality, machine condition, conditions of other workers, and so on. A 
salesman may attend to his sales volume as well as his reputation among consumers in his 
territory. A division manager will have to attend to not only short-run earnings but also long-
term growth of the division. Various members of organizations are also expected to perform 
some routine work and at once to respond flexibly to unanticipated contingencies as they arise. 
    Some tasks or dimensions are easier to measure than others. If a worker's compensation 
is contingent on the performance measures of such activities, his allocation of effort may be 
biased toward those activities in sacrifice of others that are not easily measured. The point is 
not that pay for performance does not motivate workers but that it sometimes motivates them 
too much toward some specific directions. Thus if crucial activities are not measurable, it may 
be in the employer's interest to offer a fixed salary, or at best to tie individual pay with a 
broader performance measure like profits, even if good personalized measures for specific, but 
less important actions are available. Recently, this result is formally obtained by Holmstrom 
and Milgrom (1990b). 
   This theory suggests at least two possible reasons why pay for performance, particularly 
for blue-collar workers, is not common in Japan (relative to other industrialized nations, 
although I am not aware of empirical evidence). First, Japan's status as a "late developer" 
forced Japanese firms to adapt to rapidly changing environments. As a result, workers' timely 
and flexibly responses to unforseen contingencies were likely to be more valuable to the firms 
than their routine, deterministic behavior toward specific directions." Second, as is mentioned 
in the previous subsection, job demarcation in the Japanese firm is ambiguous, and each of 
its production workers performs a wider range of jobs than more specialist-oriented workers 
in the Western firm. Then, we expect that compensation strongly tied with specific measures, 
even if they are available, may be discouraged in Japan. 
4.3. Subjective Merit Assessment and Side Trades 
   The remaining explanation fthe lack of pay for performance is associated with subjective 
measures. Performance in many jobs, particularly for white-collar workers, cannot be mea-
sured objectively. Subjective measures are then introduced. Aoki (1988) in fact claims that 
 13 There is empirical evidence that even today
, managers of large Japanese firms perceive 
their environments more volatile than those of large American firms do (Kagono et al., 1985). 
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the "importance ofmerit assessment... is one of the distinctive characteristics of the Japanese 
payment scheme and contrasts with that in the unionized A-firm, where managers have much 
less discretionary power over an individual's earnings, which instead epend on the job eval-
uation system (one single wage rate for one job) and the seniority rule." (p. 56). However, he 
also states: "The merit assessment has more weight in the promotion decision ." "The relative 
weight placed on the assessment of individual assessment in pay determination within the same 
grade differs from one firm to another. The union usually demands egalitarian treatment, and 
some firms have only a single basic pay rate for each grade." (p. 55). Although no study of 
actual data concerning the effects of merit ratings on regular increases in basic pay (as well 
as on bonuses) exists,14 its incentive ffect seems to be not so large in the short run as theory 
suggests. 
    In the rest of this section, I discuss possible problems of strong link between pay and 
merit ratings in the short run. The point is that supervisors/performance raters are also 
self-interested agents, and hence their incentives matter in the design of pay structures .15 
    The first problem is that pay for performance makes it possible for supervisors to abuse 
their positions so as to benefit themselves at the expense of their employer . To illustrate the 
problem, consider the following simple three-tier hierarchy of an employer, a supervisor, and 
two workers, drawn from Laffont (1990). Each risk averse worker i (i = 1, 2) exerts effort. His 
individual production level xi is a random variable whose value is either H (high) or L (low) 
with H > L. The probability of xi = H is increasing in worker i's effort level. However, xi 
is not observable to the employer: The only objective measure verifiable to the employer is a 
broad measure oftotal profits x = x1-+2. The employer can hire a supervisor who can observe 
and report individual production levels, which can be interpreted as merit ratings. Suppose 
that compensation is fixed at the beginning ofeach year. Thus, the first-year compensation is 
constant, while the second-year compensation can be contingent on the first-year performance. 
   This is a variant of the moral hazard model of the two-tier hierarchy where the tradeoff 
between incentives and risk sharing is the point. If the supervisor were honest, the firm 
 14 Fujimura (1989) is one exception. 
 15 The extensive use of subjective measures also affects workers' incentives: They may al-
locate too much energy to influence their supervisor's atings, in sacrifice of other productive 
activities (Milgrom, 1988; Milgrom and Roberts, 1988). This is a variant of the problem of 
allocational inefficiency discussed above, and hence is not pursued further in this section . 
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would offer each worker pay for performance in which his next-year pay is higher when his 
individual production level is high than when it is low. However, such a pay structure creates 
opportunities of covert side trades between the supervisor and the workers: The supervisor 
can form a coalition with one of the worker at the expense of the other, or he can extract 
private benefits from each worker by threatening to favor the other.16 
   Note that this sort of manipulation by the supervisor becomes possible only when each 
worker's compensation is tied with his individual rating: Laffont shows that it is sometimes 
optimal not to use the personalized pay scheme dependent on the supervisor's report in favor 
of pay contingent only on broader, more general objective measures. The latter nonperson-
alized pay structure has the shortcoming that the employer is not using valuable information 
possessed by the supervisor to provide incentives for workers. The cost of ignoring the infor-
mation will be higher if individual ratings contain additional information, e.g., about workers' 
unknown abilities. It is therefore in the firm's interest not to abandon the supervisor's in-
formation completely but to use it after some intervals, e.g., for promotion decisions. The 
delayed use of the subjective information may recreate an opportunity for detrimental side 
trades as described above. However, the chance of a successful trade seems to be smaller 
because side trades are now more difficult to enforce: When the supervisor and a worker form 
a coalition, the former will demand some favor in exchange of the promise of a counter-favor 
(good rating). The strong link between pay and ratings makes it easy for the worker to know 
whether the promise was kept. However, when the rating is only used much later in his career, 
the feasibility of side trading will be limited." 
   According to Edwards (1979) who analyzed historical evolution of the organization control 
systems in the United States, the arbitrary power of foremen/supervisors andthe resulting 
problems such as favoritism, idiosyncrasies, prejudice, and so on, were in fact observed in the 
early decades of the 20th Century. And the system was abandoned along with other systems 
to reach "bureaucratic control" systems that combine formal bureaucracy and organizational
 16 A related problem also arises in a simpler case where there is only one worker. Tirole 
(1986) analyzes uch a model to show that when the employer uses the supervisor's informa-
tion to reward the worker, the supervisor acts as an advocate and conceals evidence that is 
unfavorable to the worker. 
 17 As Tirole (1986) notes, job rotation across divisions, factories, or offices that breaks the 
long-term attachment of a worker with a particular supervisor further restricts side transfers. 
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commitment as rewards." On the other hand, close personal relations with bosses are still 
common in the Japanese firm. Yoshino (1968) emphasizes the prevalence of informal groups 
in Japanese corporate organization, and discusses adverse effects of the informal cliques that 
arise from common cohort, birthplace, or school ties on formal organization structures, em-
ployee morale, and decision making. Lincoln and Kalleberg (1990) offer quantitative evidence 
based on their systematic data that strong vertical ties (between workers and supervisors) are 
far more prevalent in factories in Japan than those in the United States. Note that these 
observations donot necessarily mply that collusive behavior detrimental to the organization 
is actually prevailing. Tirole (1986) argues that observed collusive behavior is only the tip of 
the iceberg, because organizations can anticipate and react o the possibility of coalitions to 
restrict heir formation. Aoki (1988) observes in the Japanese firm several devices that are 
intended to mitigate the danger of unfair treatment by supervisors: formalization and stan-
dardization of assessment procedures by the personnel department; job rotations both at the 
supervisory and the subordinate level; monitoring by the personnel department via grievances; 
and the importance of reputation of supervisors among subordinates for the former's career.19
4.4. Team Production and Supervisors' Career Concerns 
   The other problem associated with subjective performance appraisals and pay for per-
formance concerns the assessment of supervisors. Supervisors in general perform not only 
supervisory tasks but also productive tasks such as coordination, training, and so forth. Then 
they are judged, in part, by their subordinates' performance, because it contains valuable 
information about supervisors' effort or ability. Thus, when a supervisor's compensation de-
pends on his report concerning his subordinates' performance, his incentives to report may be 
perversely affected. 
    For example, the supervisor tends to overstate team performance when the performance 
measure is not verifiable. He inclines to overgenerosity n reporting the quality of subordinates 
 18 Ishida (1990) observes the similar problems in British firms, including Japanese factories 
in Britain. 
 19 On the other hand, some organizational practices of the Japanese firm seem to encour-
age on/off-the-job interaction with supervisors a  well as with co-workers. For example, job 
rotation within work groups facilitates mutual monitoring and inter-dependence, and hence 
creates opportunities for worker cooperation via side trades, which can be beneficial to the 
organization. See Itoh (1990, 1991b). 
                             15
when he is responsible for education and training. He may work too much to cover the problems 
in his workplace. He possibly passes responsibility for poor team performance , once detected 
by the employer, on subordinates. He tends to give subordinates undifferentiated ratings , in 
particular, when grievance systems activate. I know no formal model deriving these effects 
nor empirical evidence from Japanese data. However, the implication is that it is sometimes 
in the interest of the employer not to reward supervisors contingent on their reports in the 
short run.
    Because of these problems in transient pay for performance in the short run, the firm may 
be motivated to engage in long-term relationships with employees and to use promotions as an 
incentive device. The subsequent sections discuss this possibility. An alternative solution is to 
use dismissal as a discipline device. For example, the presence of involuntary unemployment 
makes mid-career separation costly for workers, and hence they can be motivated to work 
without pay for performance by termination-type contracts in which each worker is fired when 
detected shirking, and otherwise he is paid a fixed wage.20 This approach seems difficult to 
pursue in Japan because firing is costly as is discussed in Section 2. The implication is that 
Japan and the West may be located in quite different equilibria in labor markets, one with 
long-term relationships and the other with short-term termination contracts.21 Both equilibria 
may be characterized as the lack of immediate pay for performance, but the solution to this 
problem can be quite different from one another. 
   Before moving, let me remark on my argument in this section. Here I have not considered 
incentive effects promotions may have on workers: promotions as an incentive scheme are 
supposed to be a result from the lack of pay for performance. Note, however, that the reverse 
may be true: incentive effects from promotions may be a cause of the absence of pay for 
performance. Suppose that workers (as well as the internal or external labor market) do 
not know their ability. Then the market (in the case of internal labor market, the current 
employer) uses their current performance to update its beliefs about their ability and to 
determine their future compensation and promotions based on these updated beliefs . The 
workers are then concerned about the effects of their current performance on future career. 
 20 See MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) and Shapiro and' Stiglitz (1984) for formal models.  21 See Okuno-Fujiwara (1987) for a formal model along this line. 
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This implicit incentive effect, called career concerns, can complement the explicit incentives 
through pay for performance. Gibbons and Murphy (1990) show that pay schemes optimize 
total incentives, the mixture of the incentives from career concerns and those from pay for 
performance. Career concerns are strong when workers are young and have many potential 
promotion opportunities. For these workers, the link between pay and performance is weak. 
On the other hand, pay for performance is important for those whose career concerns are 
weak, e.g., because they are close to retirement. It is desirable to test this prediction using 
Japanese data.22 
5. Explaining Long-Term Employer-Employee Attachment 
   The previous ection offered several possible reasons why the Japanese firm does not adjust 
pay immediately and transiently after some objective or subjective performance measures of 
workers are obtained. If the transient pay for performance does not provide incentives, then 
what does? The answer seems to be promotions and the resulting substantial differences in 
lifetime earnings among workers in the Japanese firm, observed and emphasized by Tachibanaki 
(1987, 1988) and Weiss (1984, 1988). Obviously, these incentives are effective only under 
strong long-term attachment between employers and employees. How long-term employment 
relationships can be sustained in Japan is the question discussed in this section. 
   The long-term employment relationships in Japan have often been explained by some 
exogenous factors uch as traditional Japanese values tressing roupism and loyalty, or the 
lack of the competitive labor markets for those who leave firms in mid-career in Japan. There 
is in fact some vidence consistent with the latter that Japanese management practices prevail 
more in low growth areas (with fewer outside opportunities) than in high growth areas (with 
active labor markets) in a given country. (See, for example, Trevor (1983) for evidence in 
Britain.) However, in this paper, I take the proposition that it is structures and practices 
adopted by the Japanese firm which are responsible for the strong degree of employer-employee 
attachment over long periods.23 From this view, the lack of an active labor market for mid-
 22 Casual observation seems to accord with the prediction: As a worker moves up ranks
, his 
pay depends more on his performance measures.  23 For a systematic empirical study of work organization a d attitudes in the United States 
and Japan from this perspective, see Lincoln and Kalleberg (1990). 
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Icareer job changers in Japan can be characterized as an equilibrium outcome different from 
the equilibrium outcome in the West. 
    The robust long-term attachment occurs either because it is in the employee's interest 
not to leave the current firm for a new employer in his mid-career, or because it is in the 
employer's interest not to hire former employees of other firms. The following two subsections 
deal with these two facets, respectively. 
5.1. A Barrier to Exit by Wages Increasing with Seniority 
   An employee does not quit the current firm, even if he can find a new employer who 
is ready to offer a better term, because it is costly for him to do so. The most well-known 
cost is the loss of firm-specific human capital in which the worker invested. Several empirical 
studies how that tenure has a stronger effect on the slope of wage profiles in Japan than in the 
United States, and the resulting steeper wage profiles reduce labor turnover (Hashimoto and 
Raisian, 1985, 1989; Mincer and Higuchi, 1988). However, this result is also consistent with 
the agency theoretic explanation of upward sloping wage-tenure profiles initially presented by 
Lazear (1979, 1983): To discourage mid-career separation (as well as provide ffort incentives) 
firms pay workers compensation less than the value of his marginal product when they are 
young, and greater than his marginal product when old (see also Murphy (1986)). 
   I know no empirical study testing these two competing hypotheses by using Japanese 
data." There are however some empirical observations in Japan that are puzzles from the 
perspective ofspecific human capital theory. First, there is a compensation paid at the time 
of separation, the amount of which is increasing sharply with tenure, and is higher when the 
separation is for company reasons than when it is for private reasons. This practice significantly 
increases mobility costs. However, this amount cannot be explained by a sudden increase in 
specific skills. 
   More importantly, many personnel practices of the Japanese firm are easily explained 
if we assume that old workers receive compensation more than the value of their marginal 
product. First, there is mandatory retirement. Although now rare in the United States, it 
is still common among large firms in Japan (as well as in Canada, Britain, etc.). The well-
known explanation ofmandatory etirement by Lazear (1979) relies on the feature of his model 
 24 See Hutchens (1987)
, Krueger (1991), and Lazear and Moore (1986) for tests using the 
U.S. data. 
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that old workers are paid more than their value, and hence a date at which the contract is 
terminated must be fixed in advance. Second, with upward sloping wage profiles with the 
feature as above, the firm has an incentive to fire old workers. In order to maintain the wage 
profiles (to discourage mid-career separation), the firm therefore has to invest in reputation. 
The lifetime employment policy can be interpreted as such an example. Third, this feature is 
also compatible with the practice of the Japanese firm that when layoffs are inevitable, senior 
workers are the ones who are laid off first. The Japanese firm attempts to avoid layoffs in 
order to maintain reputation sustaining upward sloping wage profiles. However, when cutting 
labor costs becomes unavoidable, it is in the firm's interest to lay off those who are overpaid 
relative to their productivity. 
   Under the theory of specific human capital, senior workers are compensated less than or 
equal to the value of their marginal product (Becker, 1975; Hashimoto, 1981). The reason 
is that because specific training is productive only in the current firm, the firm bears part 
of the. cost and collects part of the return to specific training. The agency perspective can 
complement the specific human capital story in order to explain these features of the Japanese 
firm. Many empirical studies of the Japanese labor market simply assume away the agency 
hypothesis in favor of the theory of specific human capital25 to explain the finding that earnings 
increase with tenure. More rigorous tests of alternative hypotheses are required.2s
5.2. Perverse Effects o f Mid- Career Recruiting 
   Altough no empirical test is available,27 there are several possible reasons why firms may 
be reluctant to hiring those who separate from other firms (except at the bottom of the rank). 
First, outsiders may not be as productive as insiders because of the accumulation of firm-
specific human capital. An employer, when hiring a new employee, must start investing in 
specific training which is costly relative to those who have already acquired the specific skills, 
 25 Or the "living expenses guarantee hypothesis" by Ono (1989) mentioned in Section 2.  2s For example
, Mincer and Higuchi (1988) do not pursue the agency hypothesis by attribut-
ing to "the traditional reputation of Japanese workers for discipline and loyalty to the firm." 
They also assert that because assessment by supervisors plays a larger role in the careers of 
Japanese workers, upward sloping wage profiles are unnecessary in order to deter shirking. 
However, my focus here is on the wage profiles as a barrier to exit. 
 27 Tachibanaki and Taki (1990) find in Japanese data that those who have moved to bigger 
firms receive higher wages while those who have moved to smaller firms decrease their wages . 
It is however not clear which of the four stories given below these findings favor . 
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because she must cover in part his training costs. If it is true that Japanese firms invest in 
specific training more than Western firms, then this story explains lower labor turnover in 
Japan. The problem is that it is not clear.whether there in fact exist substantial differences 
in necessary skills among large firms, for example, in the same industry segment. 
   Second, there may be collusion among firms. Aoki (1988) asserts that "Japanese firms, 
particularly large and established ones, have bound themselves to an implicit code of not hiring 
former employees of other firms, particularly skilled ones..." (p. 83). They could punish those 
who deviate from that code and are detected, by reverting to fierce competition for hiring 
workers. The question is what enable large Japanese firms to sustain collusion more easily 
than Western firms. 
   The third possible reason is that hiring new employees at high hierarchical ranks may 
have negative effects on existing employees' motivation: The number of promotions available 
for the junior may be reduced, or obtaining a skilled worker from outside may send some 
negative signal to insiders concerning their capabilities. This story is pursued more in the 
next section in association with slow promotion patterns in Japan. 
   Fourth, firms may infer that a job changer is of low ability or "bad" type. Gibbons and 
Katz (1989) present a model in which the current employer has better information about worker 
ability and the market infers that job changers are of low ability. In MacLeod and Malcomson's 
(1988) model of promotion, which is discussed more in the next section, it is assumed that the 
market cannot tell whether a worker who has left a firm was fired or voluntarily quit. They 
can however show that there exists a sequential equilibrium in which the market believes that 
the final rank of the worker at the previous firm is too high in terms of his ability. A job 
changer may have difficulty in finding a job even if the market knows that he has separated 
voluntarily, because he is viewed as a bad-type worker, i.e., who tends to move again.
6. Promotions and Pay Attached to Ranks
   Promotions in this paper are defined as pay increases that result from moving up to higher 
vertical or horizontal ranks as defined in Section 2. In other words, pay is primarily attached 
to a finite number of grades or hierarchical job titles, not to individuals. This implies that 
substantial part of information concerning individuals is not used immediately for rewarding 
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them: two workers with moderately different performance histories receive approximately 
equal salaries (via assignment to the same rank). The discussion i Section 4 is relevant. 
There I explained several perverse incentive effects of using detailed individual performance 
information for rewarding workers without delay. Some of the arguments are extended to 
explain speed of promotions in this section. 
   Note that promotions to upper hierarchical ranks serve a purpose other than providing 
incentives: better matching of individuals to tasks (here including hierarchical titles) via 
learning of their ability. More information is accumulated over time about workers' potential 
ability and characteristics, and their productivity increases via improvement in job matching. 
Pay not attached to individuals is again a puzzle from the viewpoint of this second purpose 
because it does not fully use workers' productive skills or information concerning their ability.28 
   In the rest of this section, I present heories of promotions and their implications on the 
distinct characteristics in the Japanese firm, wide career and slow promotions. First, I focus 
on the learning aspect of promotions and argue that pure learning models cannot explain slow 
promotions in the Japanese firm. Next I consider the theory of rank-order tournaments, which 
focuses on promotion as a pure incentive device, and then consider interactions between these 
two facets.
6.1. Promotion as a Learning Device 
   In this section, I abstract away incentive problems to focus on the learning aspect. I 
assume that each worker's ability is initially unknown to firms as well as to himself. The 
current employer, by observing some performance measures such as merit ratings, accumulates 
information concerning the worker's true ability. The average productivity of the worker 
then increases as more information is accumulated, via reassignment to various jobs including 
 28 The theory of human capital also suggests pay attached to individuals. Williamson et 
al. (1975) offer one explanation of pay attached to particular jobs (not ranks) within the 
framework of human capital theory. Their argument hinges on the assumption that a worker 
accumulates specialized skills and information about his job, and he can have monopoly power 
against the employer. This explanation appears persuasive when applied to production workers 
in the unionized Western firm where a strict one wage rate per job is a rule. However, it has 
problems as an explanation ofthe Japanese practice. First, Japanese workers are less likely to 
obtain monopoly positions concerning their jobs, because of their wider careers: it is much less 
costly to replace aworker by somebody else in the same firm in Japan than in the West, given 
the differences in organization structures. Second, the use of subjective merit assessment for 
production workers in Japan is hard to explain under this theory.
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hierarchical titles. (The discussion i this section is thus concerning vertical ranks.) For 
a while suppose that potential employers in the outside labor market can also observe the 
same performance measures as the current employer does. Then in each period, the worker is 
assigned to the position best suited to him based on the market belief on his ability in that 
period, and is paid the expected value of his marginal product at that position. Because the 
risk-averse worker dislikes fluctuation of his earnings, the firm may instead offer a long-term 
contract in order to insure him against uncontrollable risk: Then no demotion or pay cut 
occurs, while the worker's wage increases often with promotion to higher ranks , only when his 
previous performance was so good that the updated belief on his ability increases his expected 
productivity sufficiently and consequently potential employers offer him higher wages to bid 
him away (see Harris and Holmstrom (1982)). 
    Note that in the case of symmetric information discussed above, pay is attached to indi-
viduals: workers who are assigned to the same rank, but have different performance history, 
are paid different wages at the same position. This conclusion is however sensitive to the 
assumption that the performance measures ofthe worker are observable tothe potential em-
ployers as well as the current firm: It is often the case that the current employer can have 
better information about her employees than the others, e.g., because the latter cannot ob-
serve the results of merit ratings. On the other hand, it is likely that the outside firms can 
observe mployees' hierarchical ranks and compensation ffered by the current employer (e.g., 
an employee can communicate his title and pay in a verifiable way while it is difficult for him 
to convince them of his performance in the current firm), and use them as an imperfect signal 
about ability. Waldman (1984) analyzes such a case and shows that pay attached to ranks 
arises as an optimal structure. 
    To see this, suppose for simplicity that there are two periods and two ranks, rank 1 and 
rank 2. Rank 1 is the "port of entry" to which all the new employees are assigned at the 
beginning of period 1. At the end of period 1, some performance measure of the employee 
becomes available, and for simplicity, it reveals his true ability perfectly. If his ability is 
sufficiently high, he is more productive at rank 2 than at rank 1. However, the current 
firm must consider the fact that the market can, by observing the promotion, infer that he 
is sufficiently able. Firms in the market then attempt to bid him away from the current 
employer, and she, in order to retain him, requires paying compensation compatible to the 
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offers by them. Because the outside offers are only contingent on job assignment (rank 1 or 
2), there is no reason for the current employer to use superior information about ability for 
compensation schemes. 
    Two important results arise from his model. First, there are a fewer promotions than 
would be optimal if ability information were known to the market as well. The intuition is 
that because of the discontinuous jump in pay upon promotion, it is too costly to promote 
those who are only a little more productive at rank 2 than at rank 1. Second, as the level 
of firm-specific human capital increases, this inefficient assignment diminishes, because the 
efficient assignment becomes more valuable to the current firm. 
   These results also have important implications on the speed of promotions when the model 
is extended tothe case of more than two periods. Bernhardt (1989) and Waldman (1990) show 
that promotions are delayed relative to the efficient assignment under symmetric nformation, 
and that this delay is negatively related to the proportion of skills that are firm-specific. This 
result, however, isnot consistent with empirical evidence: Specific training is more important 
in the Japanese firm and general training is more important in American firms (Hashimoto 
and Raisian, 1985, 1989; Mincer and Higuchi, 1988), while promotions are more delayed in 
the Japanese firm. The problem of the model, when it is applied to the Japanese management 
practices, appears to be the assumption of the competitive labor market. If the market is non-
competitive, then the current employer has no incentive to conceal information concerning 
worker ability, and hence she assigns workers efficiently, resulting in no delay in promotions . 
Competition among divisions within a firm could mimic the competition in the external labor 
market, but casual observation does not reveal such competition as a typical practice in the 
Japanese firm.
6.2. Promotion Lottery as an Incentive Device 
   I next focus on promotions as an incentive scheme. Lazear and Rosen (1981) view 
salaries as prizes of promotion lotteries and grades as names for prizes. Consider the standard 
principal-agent model in which several risk-averse workers exert unobservable ffort which 
along with uncontrollable factors determines individual performance. The workers with best 
performance among them, whose proportion is specified by the contract, are promoted to a 
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higher ank with a higher pay (winning prize) fixed in advance." This contest works as a 
strong motivator. Note that the workers' abilities are assumed to be common knowledge, and 
hence we assume away the learning aspect of promotions. 
    There are three oft-argued reasons why this rank-order tournament scheme may be pre-
ferred by the firm. First, it only requires much coarser information of ordinal ranking among 
workers' performance than cardinal performance measures, and hence its monitoring costs will 
be smaller. Second, workers' earnings are less affected by uncontrollable noise because their 
performance ranking is insensitive to common random factors. For example, if the perfor-
mance of each worker depends on his effort, his machine condition, and the production system 
of the factory the last of which is uncontrollable and common to all the workers, the last two 
factors are simply a noise to him, and his pay should not fluctuate contingent on them. While 
the last common noise factor affects his absolute performance, it does not affect his relative 
performance. And his ranking among the workers is one example of his relative performance, 
which filters out the common uncontrollable factor. Note however that this is not a strong rea-
son to choose 'pay attached to grades than to individuals because the employer could use more 
elaborated relative performance measures, such as bonuses contingent on the performance of 
a worker elative to the mean performance among the workers (Holmstrom, 1982). 
   Third, the effectiveness of the rank-order tournament scheme is not affected by the sub-
tle condition of whether or not individual performance measures are verifiable (Carmichael, 
1983; Malcomson, 1984). If they are not verifiable and hence labor contracts contingent on 
those measures are not enforceable xplicitly, the firm has incentives to renege on what is 
specified in the contracts: For example, the firm may not raise wages upon observation of 
good performance, as is specified by the contract, by reporting that performance was not good 
enough. However, under tournament schemes, the firm has nothing to gain by being dishonest: 
misreporting a worker's performance being bad when it is actually good simply increases the 
probability that the other workers win the competition. For this argument o work, the prize 
must be attached to a hierarchical title which must be filled, or when it is attached to a pay 
grade, the proportion of workers to be promoted there must be verifiable. These conditions 
seem easier to satisfy than verifiability of performance measures. 
 29 If one assumes that there are "many" employees (a continuum of them)
, then specify-
ing the proportion to be promoted is equivalent to specifying a threshold level of absolute 
performance. 
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    Of course, repeated interaction and reputation can make contracts contingent on unver-
ifiable measures self-enforcing. Such implicit contracts are costly, however, because the firm 
must earn a surplus by abiding by implicit agreement with workers (MacLeod and Malcomson, 
1989). Since the rank-order tournament schemes do not require such a surplus, they have the 
advantage over pay attached to individuals in the long run. 
Problems of the rank-order tournaments: Because the rank-order tournament scheme is but 
one special form of pay for performance, it is subject o the same problems as discussed in
Section 4: fixed costs of risk sharing, danger of tying pay with specific objective measures (in-
cluding influence costs), and, in particular, perverse effects of merit ratings. Several practices 
observed in the Japanese firm can be interpreted as ways to mitigate the problems associated 
with subjective merit ratings. Aoki (1988) observes rotation of both supervisors and subordi-
nates in the Japanese firm. Yoshino (1968) finds that in the Japanese firm "one is rewarded 
for his competence only after he proves his ability to the satisfaction of everyone concerned." 
(p. 237, emphasis added.) These organizational responses to the vertical collusion problem 
naturally lead to the distinct management characteristics in Japan, wide career and slow pro-
motions. Another way to alleviate the problems is to introduce some exogenous criteria such 
as seniority in promotion decisions, again compatible with the Japanese management practice. 
    There are some extra costs of tournaments themselves. First, workers who compete for 
higher positions have no incentive to cooperate. Under tournaments, each worker can increase 
his winning probability by engaging in "sabotage," reducing performance of his competitors 
(Lazear, 1988; Itoh, 1991b). Thus, if cooperation among workers i  critical as in work organi-
zation of the Japanese firm, those who compete for promotions should be separated. Second, 
contestants have incentives to collude to choose lower effort levels. Thus, they should be again 
separated or their tasks should be designed so as to prevent them from mutually monitoring 
their effort, if the firm would like to encourage workers to cooperate as a work group where 
mutual monitoring and sanctioning enforce their coordinated effort :30 In the Japanese firm, 
employees in the same category in terms of the year of graduation from collage are subject 
to the same promotion process. Although I know no data, extensive rotations enable them to 
work in various departments, regional offices, or factories, and, as a result, there is a small 
 30 The conditions for the firm to prefer doing so are obtained in Holmstrom and Milg
rom 
(1990a), Itoh (1990), and Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1991). 
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chance that they work together in the same place, in particular, in large firms. Such a practice 
will make it possible for the Japanese firm to attain effective cooperation and competition 
simultaneously. 
    Third, incentives for those who have lost contests are absent under tournament schemes. 
Consider a sequence of elimination tournaments in which winners of a tournament proceed to 
the next tournaments, in order to attain higher positions, while losers are completely elimi-
nated from competition. Competition for higher ranks in hierarchical organizations appears 
to be well represented by such a sequence of elimination tournaments (Hanada, 1989; Rosen-
baum, 1979).31 If the firm wants the losers to continue to exert high effort in the rest of their 
career, then it may be in the interest of the firm to reduce the speed of promotions, in order 
to keep effort incentives of all the members high, by increasing the proportion of workers to 
be promoted in their early career. 
   Note that the slow promotion of this sort has costs as well. First, delay in promotion 
will increase costs of misassignment of able employees to lower-level jobs. Second, talented 
employees may quit to receive higher compensation elsewhere. Third, if workers call have 
control over riskiness of their decision making (e.g., they choose risky projects), their choice 
may be biased, from the firm's viewpoint, against risky actions too much under elimination 
tournaments with many winners in early rounds. It may therefore be in the interest of the 
firm not to slow promotions but to change the structure of elimination tournaments o that 
early losers can be given second chances to catch up with early winners later in their career. 
This argument is also found in Hanada (1989). 
   The optimal speed of promotions will be determined by the tradeoff between the benefits 
and the costs mentioned above. The argument here predicts slower promotions in the Japanese 
firm because mid-career separation of able workers seems more costly in Japan, and because 
the incentives of the losers seem particularly important for Japanese type work organization 
in which much responsibility is delegated to lower levels of hierarchy. 
6.3. Interaction of .Learning and Incentives 
   If the incentive effects of promotions are important in the Japanese firm, the results 
from the pure learning model of promotions in Section 6.1, which are not consistent with the 
 31 See Rosen (1986) for a model of elimination tournaments. 
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observation of the Japanese practices, may be due to this lack of incentive problems there. I 
here present several recent studies of promotions that incorporate both learning and incentive 
facets into rigorous models. 
    Prendergast (1990a) introduces into a learning model workers' incentives to collect costly 
firm-specific skills. Only the current employer (not workers) can learn about heir abilities, and 
the issue is whether or not she reveals ability information to workers before training. She can 
do so credibly by promoting and giving pay raise to only workers with sufficiently high ability. 
Some of the other workers are then discouraged to collect skills. This case is interpreted as 
the American mode of career development. Alternatively, the employer can conceal ability 
information from workers by offering the same terms to all of them. All the workers are then 
motivated to collect skills. This second case is the Japanese mode of slow promotions. 
    He shows that without competitive external labor markets, the Japanese mode is preferred 
to the American mode if the returns to specific training are sufficiently high, because the former 
alleviates the firm's incentive to exaggerate workers' talent to induce them to collect skills. 
This result seems compatible with the observation that specific skills are more important in 
Japanese work organization. He also shows that if the external labor market is competitive, 
the advantage of the Japanese system under no labor market disappears because bids from 
the market reveal ability information to workers.32 
   Prendergast (1990c) considers career concerns, which arise in the learning model when 
the moral hazard problem is present, i.e., workers can exert unobservable effort to influence 
the beliefs on their ability held by the internal or external labor market. Two workers with 
symmetric uncertainty about each worker's ability joins a firm. The employer observes some 
signal about each worker's ability, which fact determines the "leader" and the "follower." 
She then trains two workers through on-the-job training while the workers exert effort, and 
additional signals on ability become available. Based on the updated beliefs on ability and 
the returns to training, one of them is promoted to a higher rank with higher pay. 
   He shows that when no competitive labor market exists, the firm designs on-the-job 
 32 The current firm's incentive to conceal information from the market will not preclude 
information leakage perfectly. On the other hand, if the American system is optimal with no 
labor market (e.g., because specific training is too costly), the bids from the labor market do 
not have detrimental effects, while the incentive to conceal appears. The net result may be 
slower promotions with the competitive labor market han without, for the reason discussed 
in Section 6.1. 
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training such that the leader is handicapped: the follower is given more training so that their 
race is "tight." This case seems closer to the Japanese practice that everyone is given a chance 
to receive training and to demonstrate its potential capability . On the other hand, when 
the labor market is competitive, the leader is given more training , which result Prendergast 
interprets as "star treatment" typical in the American firm . 
    Note that in both papers Prendergast takes the competitiveness of the external labor 
market as an exogenous factor. However, the lack of the competitive labor market may 
arise endogenously from his models (see Section 5.2 for relevant discussion). Suppose that in 
Prendergast (1990a), the Japanese mode of slow promotion isoptimal with no labor market, 
and that offers by a firm to outsiders are observable to its own employees. Then such offers 
before training reveal ability information to own employees, which discourages them to collect 
skills. It may therefore be in the interest of firms not to offer outsiders high job ranks when 
the Japanese type pooling scheme is optimal in the absence of the competitive labor market. 
Similarly, in Prendergast (1990c), if the firm attempts to hire a leader away from other firms, 
anticipating such a possibility, the employees reduce their effort because the marginal return 
to effort decreases as the probability of winning a high rank is reduced. 
   The implication from this argument is the same as that given at the beginning of Section 
5: The Western management and the Japanese management may represent two different 
equilibria one of which has a competitive labor market and the other has a non-competitive 
one. 
   Another model worth mentioning is the self-selection model by MacLeod and Malcomson 
(1988) which Aoki (1988) uses to explain economic rationale of wages attached to pay grades in 
the Japanese firm. They consider the adverse-selection case where the ability of each worker 
is his private information. Because performance measures are not verifiable, self-enforcing 
contracts are of termination type: if the performance of a worker is unsatisfactory, he is 
fired, while given that his performance is satisfactory, his pay is independent of his current 
performance level. They show that the equilibrium rank hierarchy has a finite number of pay 
grades, despite a continuum of possible ability levels. The intuition is that in the equilibrium 
they consider, when a worker separates from the employer, the market infers that he was 
assigned to a pay grade too high in terms of his true ability. Thus, in the new firm, he is 
assigned to a grade just below his previous one. The number of grades must therefore be finite 
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and the utility difference between grades must be discrete, in order to make shirking and the 
resulting separation costly. In equilibrium, each worker self-selects the grade appropriate to 
his ability, and hence no separation occurs. From the firm's point of view, self-selection is 
optimally attained by first assigning all the workers to the lowest grade, and promoting them 
one grade each period if his performance satisfies the promotion criteria, until each of them 
reaches his optimal grade. The firm makes positive profits from each worker before he reaches 
his grade. 
   Their model explains the optimality of promotion schemes, but does not provide clear 
insights on the speed of promotions." More seriously, the use of termination-type contracts 
in Japan appears to be limited, because it is costly for the firm to fire workers: As I mention 
in Section 2, the "lifetime" employment policy binds employers both implicitly and explicitly. 
MacLeod and Malcomson consider contacts of termination type because they are only self-
enforcing contracts given that performance measures are not verifiable. Although this story 
may characterize the equilibrium in labor markets in the West, I conjecture that the Japanese 
firm, because of the additional constraints, takes another route, using unverifiable performance 
measures (in particular, subjective merit assessments) by mitigating the verifiability problems 
by some means.
6.4. Notes on Seniority as a Promotion Criterion 
    Before closing the section, I comment on the question: why seniority is an important 
determinant of promotions in the Japanese firm. Seniority seems to provide some upper 
bound on the speed of promotions. However capable a worker is known to be, he has to wait 
for promotions to high hierarchical ranks until he becomes ufficiently senior (tenure or age). 
One obvious reason is specific human capital. Even if a worker's potential ability is high, he 
needs to accumulate specific skills before promoted. A related reason is that the seniority rule 
 33 One possible explanation comes from the feature of their promotion process that the firm 
can increase its profits by shirking and delaying promotion. In the equilibrium MacLeod and 
Malcomson consider, the market beliefs are optimistic enough to enable employees to deter 
such shirking by the employer costlessly by quitting the firm. However, if a worker's cost of 
mid-career separation is high (e.g., because the market beliefs for the ability of job changers 
are quite pessimistic), he will prefer staying and accepting delay to separating from the firm, 
and hence promotion delay may prevail. Alternatively, slow promotion and wide career could 
arise from their model because the performance measures are often subjective and hence the 
problems associated with merit ratings are inevitable in their model as well. 
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seniority rule enables senior employees to smoothly transfer their skills and information to 
young employees, as well as to evaluate the latter honestly. Without the rule, the senior would 
have incentives to reduce promotion prospects of the young. This argument is more relevant 
in the Japanese firm because of the importance of on-the-job training and merit assessments 
in its work organization. The similar argument holds for hiring decisions. To provide senior 
employees with incentives to hire able individuals, the firm must give the senior some guarantee 
that those capable young employees will not jeopardize their positions. Given the high costs 
of mid-career separation such a consideration is likely to be more serious in Japan.
7. Concluding Remarks 
    The existing literature on Japanese firms mostly focuses on what-questions: what is 
different and what is similar in the Japanese management practices? This paper instead 
focuses on why-questions concerning internal incentives in the Japanese firm from economic 
perspectives. 
    There are three main messages in the paper. First, if we take work organization structures 
of the Japanese firm given, then its reward structures and employment relationships are quite 
consistent with the insights from the recent literature in economic theories of organizations. 
More rigorous studies of pay and promotion schemes are required, but the lack of theoretical 
studies of organization structures appears to be a more serious problem in the theoretical 
point of view. Successful models could explain simultaneously the distinct features of work 
organization and employment structures in the Japanese firm, along with market conditions. 
They would also offer more consistent explanation of the differences between the Japanese firm 
and the Western firm, e.g., they might characterize the contrast as two different equilibria in 
the models. 
    Second, although much comparative empirical evidence on the Japanese management 
practices is now available, rigorous tests of alternative theories are still absent. It seems to 
me that most of those who study Japanese human resource management have exclusively 
focused on the theory of firm-specific human capital, regarding incentive issues as irrelevant 
in the Japanese firm, for some exogenous reasons. I think that specific skills are important 
determinants of the Japanese practices, but as I argue in the paper, they are not likely to be 
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the whole story: Some empirical observations can be explained in a more consistent way by 
incentive theory. Our further understanding on the Japanese human resource management 
practices will improve substantially when we can obtain micro personnel data from Japanese 
firms and test several theories. 
   Third, many distinct features of the Japanese human resource management, along with 
other features of organization and market structures, are likely to constitute a "system": they 
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